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Abstract: This paper examines the impact of congressional representation of a university
through district representation or an alma mater affiliation on the distribution of research
funding to research and doctoral universities in the United States. Because appropriations
are allocated to agencies on an annual basis, Congress and agencies may be considered
strategic actors that seek to minimize as well as exploit their differences in informational
asymmetries.  Using a data set that covers more than twenty-five years of data, I find
there are strong effects from congressional representation on the distribution of research
funding.  These effects vary based on the type of representation, the seniority of the
member serving on the committee, as well as the type of ownership of the university
(private or public).  Depending on the empirical specification, political diversions of
research funding range between four and forty-eight percent.  Surprisingly, the diversions
associated with an alma mater affiliation are more robust than the diversions associated
with district representation, suggesting the existence of political slack. These results
suggest that informational asymmetries play a role in the level of congressional influence
on agency actions.  In addition, the results suggest that actions taken by members of the
appropriations committees vary based on their tenure on the committees.
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In 1994 members of the Republican Party pledged to seek legislation to impose term
limits on members of Congress. This pledge stemmed from the popular belief that senior
members of Congress tend to promote personal interests or are more influenced by lobbying
efforts that may not be representative of their constituents.  Today, term limits continue to be
discussed but have not been enacted; instead, many members have focused their energies
towards minimizing the time spent on any particular committee of Congress, believing that
tenure on a committee is a more serious concern than mere tenure in Congress. Implicit in these
concerns is the issue whether as incumbent politicians plan to retire whether they will behave
differently and, if so, whether tenure on a congressional committee exacerbates this behavior.
This paper explores the role of membership on the appropriations committee on the
distribution of federal research funding to research and doctoral universities.  Specifically, it
explores whether politicians use their position on a committee to promote interests that are
different from their constituents.  Previous research has explored the existence of such “slack
behavior” by using the voting records of politicians on certain issues and relating it to
demographic and economic characteristics of the politicians’ constituents.  This paper explores
the issue of slack differently.  Using a data set that spans 25 years, I explore how membership on
the appropriations committee affects the distribution of federal funding with respect to research
conducted by research and doctoral universities.  I compare the effect of having a member with
an alma mater affiliation with the effect of having a member with a university located in the
member’s district.  I use district representation to proxy favoritism that reflects a politician’s
constituents.  Given in most instances an alma mater affiliation is not the same as district
representation (state representation if the member is a senator), I use alma mater affiliation to
proxy favoritism that reflects more from the politician’s personal interests.3
With respect to research funding (and most types of discretionary funding), the ability of
a member of Congress to engage in slack behavior will be tied to the relationship between
Congress and the agency responsible for distributing the funding.  Thus, we must take into
account the principal-agent hypothesis between Congress and agencies.  Under the principal-
agent hypothesis, the degree by which Congress may impact an agency’s decisions depends on
the level of informational asymmetries.  Inefficiencies may result from either too much
congressional or too much agency dominance thereby increasing the social cost of a good or
service provided through a government agency.  Inefficiencies that arise from congressional
control of bureaucratic behavior stem from congressional members, acting alone or together,
taking actions based on the interests of certain constituents as well as following their own
ideology or interests.  Inefficiencies that arise from agency control of bureaucratic behavior stem
from the agency’s desire to maximize its size or power.
Federal research funding accounts for more than 60 percent of research funding received
by research universities.  Previous research has shown a positive impact of research funding on
research outcomes (see, e.g. Adams and Griliches (1998), and Payne and Siow (2000), Connolly
(1997), Payne (1999, 2000)).  Arora and Gambardella (1997), examining NSF funding to
economists over a five-year period, find a positive correlation between agency funding and
young researchers and less of an impact on more senior researchers.  With the exception of
Payne and Siow (2000), these papers do not consider that political diversion of funds may
promote or detract from research productivity as with any other federal program.
This paper takes a fresh approach at examining the impact of congressional
appropriations committees on the distribution of research funding to universities. Others have
studied issues regarding the allocation of federal research (see, e.g., Lazear (1996), Lichtenberg4
(1998), and Savage (1991, 1999)).
1  Savage (1991, 1999) explores issues concerning
congressional earmarking of funds to universities, focusing on the relationship between key
members on the appropriations subcommittees.  His study suggests the chairs of the
appropriations subcommittees possess the power to prevent or minimize the extent of pork
barreling in the appropriations bills with respect to earmarked funding.
I concentrate on the impact of membership on the House and Senate appropriations
committees since these committees wield the greatest power in the allocation of research
funding.  My work extends and differs from the work of Savage (1991) along two dimensions.
First, I examine total federal research funding whereas Savage explored only earmarked funding.
Second, I explore the role of membership on the appropriations committee using a panel
structure to the data.  Thus, I explore in more depth the role of having members join and leave
the appropriations committees after controlling for the heterogeneity that exists across different
universities.  Initially, I find very little evidence of an effect of district representation on the
distribution of research funding to research and doctoral universities; after extensive analysis, I
find that the distribution of research funding is correlated with district representation.  I find the
distribution of federal research funding is strongly affected by the political process when I
examine the alma mater affiliation of members on the appropriations committee.  Thus, my
results suggest several things.  First, it appears that with respect to district representation,
personality may matter in the role that politics plays.  This confirms the research conducted by
Savage (1991), who finds that individual members play a significant role in promoting or
limiting distributive politics.  Second, to the extent that alma mater affiliation can be associated
                                                
1 Lichtenberg (1998) studies the allocation process of biomedically funded research, examining the relationship
between the distribution of funds to research projects and the expected life-years lost associated with the diseases on
which the research is being conducted.  Lazear (1996) studies the incentives provided by agencies to researchers in
the structure of their allocation process. Using an overlapping generations model, he examines such questions as5
with slack behavior, the results suggest that slack behavior does exist, especially with respect to
more senior members serving on the appropriations committee.  Given the average diversion
from having a political affiliation by a senior member ranges between $1 and $18 million,
depending on the analysis, the net affect of having a senior member on the committee suggests a
diversion of research funding that ranges between two and forty-two percent of research funding.
These diversions represent a social cost to the awarding of research funding insofar as politically
driven funding results in less productive research.  Although previous research suggests federal
funding can increase research output, political diversions, may, in part, reduce the effectiveness
of federal funding.
The paper is set forth as follows.  Section I presents a conceptual framework and section
II provides a brief overview of the appropriations process as it relates to research funding.
Section III discusses the data and methodology used to measure the level of political influence
over research funding.  Section IV discusses the results and Section V provides a brief
conclusion.
I.  Conceptual Framework
Since WWII, the federal government has played a significant role in funding basic and
applied research.  The federal government became more heavily involved as a result of its
recognition that research is important for economic growth and that the private sector was under
engaged in the research process.  The Bush report recommended the establishment of a single
agency that would be responsible for allocating all federal funding appropriations for research.
Although the National Science Foundation was established as a result of the Bush report, it did
not become the sole agency responsible for allocating research funding. Most agencies have
                                                                                                                                                            
what topics should be funded, whether small and large awards should be made, to what extent should past research
experience be considered, and whether junior and senior researchers should be treated differently.6
adopted a peer-reviewed process for distributing research funding to universities.  This process
attempts to elicit information from researchers engaged in similar research about the quality of
the projects for which funding is sought, seeking to minimize the politics associated with federal
agencies and Congress.  The agencies, however, are not completely autonomous from Congress.
Thus, Congress may indirectly influence the actions taken by the agencies.  Because agencies
receive their funding from Congress (with the approval of the President), Congress has several
avenues by which to monitor and/or control an agency’s actions, ex-ante and ex-post.  Thus
Congress and agencies are likely to be strategic in their actions, thereby creating a principal-
agent relationship (see, e.g., Miller & Moe (1983)).
2  The degree to which an agency reflects the
preferences of Congress depends on the level of information asymmetries between Congress and
the agencies (see, Calvert, McCubbans, and Weingast (1994)).
With respect to research funding, assuming that most members lack the information
needed to evaluate the quality of research proposals, potential areas of influence they may exert
over an agency may be with respect to funding allocated to an agency.  Thus, if Congress is not
satisfied with the distribution of funding to certain schools or to geographic areas, funding to
agencies in future years may be affected.  For example, if members believe that more research
funding should be devoted to such things as cancer research or a “star wars” defense program,
the budget can be adjusted to focus more funding on these areas, thus, potentially minimizing the
discretion an agency may have over the distribution of funding within the agency.  Similarly, if a
member is from a region that is known to be an expert in a particular area of research, that
member may seek to promote funding to programs related to that research area.
                                                
2 Similar in this vein is the transaction cost framework.  See Huber and Shipan (2000) for a discussion of how this
framework explains legislative control of bureaucratic behavior.7
In addition to affecting the level of funding that agencies may distribute and the programs
under which the agencies must operate, in recent years, Congress has affected the distribution of
research funding in two other, more direct, ways.  First, Congress can directly appropriate
funding by earmarking specific amounts to particular universities.  Earmarks started being
allocated to universities in large numbers in the early 1980s.
3  Savage (1999) documents and
explores the issues surrounding earmarked funding.  Despite much media coverage concerning
earmarks, they represent a small portion of research funding.  A second way Congress has
affected the distribution of research funding, is by encouraging agencies to develop set-aside
programs whereby agencies seek more competitive research proposals from researchers affiliated
with universities that are located in states that have historically received low levels of funding.
Set-aside programs were established in the early 1980s as pilot projects and have grown in the
last 30 years. These programs solicit more competitive proposals from researchers affiliated with
a university (or other research institute) located in a state designated for a set-aside program.
Thus, set-aside programs limit the number of competitive proposals that will be considered for
funding by limiting the number of states with which researchers may be affiliated.
For a more complete description of the different methods used to allocate federal research
funding, see Feller (1999).  Given there are several ways in which Congress may affect the
distribution of funding, the next issue concerns for what purpose may a member of Congress
seek redistribution.  As set forth in Peltzman (1976, 1984) and others, a politician’s actions may
be driven from an interest to represent all or part of his constituents or for personal reasons.  If a
politician does not reflect the interest of his constituents, he is considered to be shirking his
responsibility and engaging in political slack (see, also, Huber, Shipan and Pfahler (2001) and
Rothenberg and Sanders (2000)).
                                                
3 See Savage (1991, 1999) for a more detailed description of earmarking.8
Little research has examined the role of slack with respect to the appropriations process
(see, Adler (2000)). With respect to federal research funding, there are several reasons why a
politician may want to have funding distributed to the universities located in his district.  First,
given that research funding benefits the university by increasing the level of university resources,
this will benefit the community and/or promote growth of other sectors within the district.
Second, constituents may judge a politician by his ability to bring federal funding to his district.
Thus, if politicians can affect the distribution of research funding, we should see an effect with
respect to those universities located in the district represented by the politician.
Similarly, a politician may encourage research funding to a particular university for
personal reasons, thus, demonstrating slack behavior.  The presence of slack is difficult to
measure with respect to research funding.  One potential measure of slack is with respect to those
universities from which a politician received an undergraduate degree.  Assuming the university
is not located in the same area represented by the politician, there is little reason to suggest that
favoring one’s alma mater promotes the interests of a politician’s constituents.
4
To explore the effect of political representation on the distribution of federal research
funding, I examine the relationship between research and doctoral universities and the members
of Congress that sit on the appropriations committee. As explained in more detail below, for each
member on the appropriations committee between 1972 and 1998, I identified the universities
located in their district as well as the universities from which they received an undergraduate
degree.  In addition, I identified their status and tenure on the committee.  All of this was hand-
                                                
4 One argument against this is if one’s constituents are interested in a particular type of research and the best
research is being conducted at the member’s alma mater institution.  For example, if a particular district or state has
experienced an epidemic of some disease, relative to other districts or states and the best research related to the
epidemic is being conducted by a university in another district that happens to be the member’s alma mater.
Although this scenario is certainly plausible, given the distribution of alma mater affiliated universities and the
empirical specification used in this paper, the likelihood of this type of phenomenon being the primary explanation
of a relationship between alma mater affiliation the distribution of research funding is very low.9
collected using publicly available information.  With this information, I explore the questions of
whether politicians affect the distribution of federal research funding and, if so, the extent to
which the distribution is attributable to constituent interests or political slack.
II. Appropriations Process and Research Funding
Detailed accounts of the appropriations process may be found in Fenno (1966), National
Academy of Science (1995), and Schick (1995).  A history of the research funding process and
the role of the federal government may be found in Drew (1984), Gieger (1993), and Kleinman
(1995).   With respect to discretionary funding (funding that is not required to be allocated under
mandatory entitlements, e.g. social security, Medicaid), the appropriations committee is
responsible for the budgets of all agencies.  Although the entire Congress and President must
approve the final budget bill, much of the discussion concerning the structure of the budget is
discussed and developed by the appropriations committees and subcommittees.  In addition to
determining the annual appropriations, these committees also provide guidance to agencies with
respect to the expenditures of their funds.  Although, agencies are not required to follow this
guidance, it is expected that most agencies will attempt to comply with the wishes of the
appropriations committees, given these committees are initially responsible for the
appropriations to the agencies every year.
The classic work discussing the role taken by members of the appropriations committee
is that of Fenno (1966).
5  In general, it has been shown that members of this committee tend to
exert much power over the budget.  Positions on the committee and the subcommittees are
coveted.  Provided a member succeeds in his or her reelection efforts, once on the appropriations
committee, the member is likely to serve several terms on the committee.  Members who are
                                                                                                                                                            
5 See, also, Savage (1991).10
appointed to the appropriations committee are prevented from serving on any standing
committee of Congress, thereby emphasizing the importance of their role on the appropriations
committee.  As a result of the complexity of the government’s budget and tenure on the
committee, members develop a great deal of expertise with respect to the appropriations process.
Thus, other members of Congress tend to defer to the decisions made by the appropriations
committees.  The role on an appropriations subcommittee can be just as important, if not more,
as the role on the appropriations committee insofar as the subcommittee is responsible for the
initial allocation to specific federal agencies.
With respect to the mechanics of the appropriations committee, the party in power of
each chamber decides the number of majority and minority members that will serve on the
appropriations committee.  Each party selects their members to the committee.  The chair of the
appropriations committee determines who serves on each of the thirteen subcommittees.  In
terms of the budget process, each year the President submits a proposed budget that includes
each agency’s request for funding.  The level of detail for agency funding varies across the
different agencies.  The appropriations committee in the House reviews and changes the budget.
The Senate acts second, therefore, acting more as an appellate body for the budget.
6  In the end,
the two chambers and the President must approve the budget.
There are several ways a university may receive special treatment with respect to
research funding. Influence by Congress may stem from the university, an agency, independently
by a Congress member’s effort, or through the efforts of lobbyists.  Members’ actions may be
direct or indirect.  Direct actions include earmarking specific amounts to particular universities
                                                
6 Although the Constitution dictates that revenue raising measures must be initiated in the House of Representatives,
there is no such provision with respect to the appropriations process.11
or directing agencies to appropriate funds to specific universities.
7  Earmarks started being
allocated to universities in large numbers in 1983.  Despite much media coverage concerning
earmarks, however, they represent a small portion of research funding.  Thus, most research
funds continue to be processed and determined by federal agencies.  Congressional influence
over the direction of research funding is likely to be more through indirect means.
8
III. Data and Methodology
The data for this project were gathered from two sources: congressional appropriations
committee data and CASPAR data on federal funding and institutional characteristics.
9  For
information on the congressional appropriations committees, I hand collected data on
congressional membership on the appropriations committee and subcommittees for both
chambers of Congress for the period 1970 to 1998.  Except for the occurrence of a death or
resignation, both committees may change members every two years.
10  For each member that
served on the appropriations committee during this period, I identified the state represented by
the member, the political party affiliation of the member, the member’s position on the
                                                
7 Examples of recent earmarks include $300,000 to the University of California at Davis for research on rice straw;
$3.9 million to the University of Maryland for the fuel cell bus program; $220,000 to the University of Maine for
research on low bush blueberries.
8 Congress, the President, and/or agencies could initiate this influence.  The common perception is that a member of
Congress may initiate a request for favoritism. Favoritism, however, could be initiated by the agency.  Under the
assumption that most agencies desire more funds for their activities, one way to “justify” a bigger budget could be
through awarding grants to universities affiliated with the members of the appropriations committee.  This paper
does not distinguish between favoritism initiated by members of Congress and favoritism initiated by agencies or
other governmental entities. Similarly, universities may or may not seek favoritism from Congress members, either
directly or through collective lobbying groups.  Savage (1999) discusses reasons why a university may seek
favoritism from Congress.  Although it is common for a university or group of universities to maintain lobbyists in
Washington to keep informed about proposed changes that would affect the operation of their universities, this paper
does not distinguish between those universities that actively seek special treatment from those that do not.
9 CASPAR stands for Computer Aided Science Policy Analysis and Research.  It includes several data sets collected
by NSF, National Center for Education Statistics, and other federal agencies.  Information on CASPAR may be
found at http://www.nsf.gov.
10 This is due to the fact that there are elections for both chambers every two years.  In the House of Representatives,
all members must be elected or re-elected every two years.  In the Senate, one-third of the members are elected or
re-elected every two years since a given member holds office for six years.12
committee, the undergraduate alma maters of the member, and the district of representation.
11
With respect to the member’s position on the committee, there are three possible positions,
majority and minority chair person and general member.  The majority chair is assigned to a
member affiliated with the political party that controls the chamber of Congress for which the
members serve; the minority chair is assigned to a member affiliated with the political party not
in control.  I concentrate on the members that are not the majority or minority chair person of the
appropriations committee.  I do this because during the sample period, there are few changes in
these positions, thus, allowing for little variation in the data analysis.
Using the CASPAR data set, I gathered financial data on the universities on an annual
basis for the period 1973 to 1997.  There are several measures of government funding which may
be used.  I use the federal obligations for science and engineering.  This measure reports the
actual obligations of the federal government made in the fiscal year for which the data are
reported.  I combined these data with the data on congressional representation and determined
those universities for which there is alma mater and/or district representation for each year
during the period under study.
I limit my analysis to those universities with a Carnegie (1994) classification of research
or doctoral university.
12  This leaves 230 universities that I can analyze. Approximately 55
percent of these universities are classified as a research university.  Of these 230 universities, 73
of the universities have alma mater representation and 181 of the universities have district
                                                
11 In some of the larger metropolitan areas, it was difficult to distinguish which members represented which
universities.  Therefore, I was over inclusive in assigning the universities to representatives.  For example, if there is
a member on the House appropriations committee that serves a part of Manhattan, then Columbia University and
NYU university (and all other universities located in Manhattan) would be treated as part of the member’s district.
12 Research universities are defined as those that give high priority to research and award at least 50 doctoral degrees
each year.  Doctoral universities differ from Research universities in that they do not meet minimum requirements
with respect to federal support the number of doctorate degrees awarded. While there are universities that have
obtained the research or doctoral institution status subsequent to 1972, there is little or no attrition of universities
from these classifications.13
representation at some point during the sample period.  Of the 73 universities with an alma mater
affiliation, there are 58 universities with an affiliation in the House and 38 universities with an
affiliation in the Senate.
13  Of the 181 universities that are represented, 45 universities are
represented in the House and 168 universities are represented in the Senate.
14  A list of
universities and their type of alma mater and/or district affiliation is provided in Appendix 1.
To compare representation with no representation in the table of means, I lag the
congressional measures by one-year on the assumption that the funding is allocated to the agency
in the first year and the funding is distributed by the agency to the university in the second year.
For the graphs and regression analysis, I use a two-year moving average of the federal research
funding.
15 In addition, the federal funding measure is reported in constant dollars with 1996 as
the base year, using the deflation index for higher education as provided by CASPAR.
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the annual federal research funding to research and
doctoral universities during the period studied.
16  Across all 230 universities, the average level of
funding is $42 million; the average is slightly higher for private universities.  For the universities
for which there is at least one year district representation during the sample period, the average
level of funding is $43 million for the years for which there was representation and $47 million
for the years for which there was no representation.  This suggests there is no strong positive
relationship in the distribution of research funding based on district representation.  For the
                                                
13 Of the 58 universities with an alma mater affiliation in the House, 18 universities are private and 40 universities
are public.  Of the 38 universities with an alma mater affiliation in the Senate, 11 universities are private and 27
universities are public.
14 Of the 45 universities with district representation in the House, 24 universities are private and 21 universities are
public.  Of the 168 universities with district representation in the Senate, 63 universities are private and 105
universities are public.
15 In many agencies, research grants are awarded in one year but then distributed to the university over several years,
whereas the funding to the agency is allocated over an annual basis.  Thus, this raises an empirical issue as to how to
compare congressional representation and the distribution of funding.  In the analysis, I have used different lag
lengths as well as averaged the data over two and three year periods.  The results vary insignificantly based on what
empirical structure that is used.  I choose to use a two-year moving average for the regression analysis because the
standard errors are lowest under this specification.14
universities for which there is an alma mater affiliation by a member for at least one-year during
the sample period, the average level of funding is higher than the average level of funding across
all universities.  The average level of funding is $76 million for the years for which there was an
affiliation and $54 million for the years for which there was no affiliation.  This suggests a strong
positive relationship in the distribution of research funding based on an alma mater affiliation.
Table 1 does not take into account two issues.  First, it does not reflect that the level of
funding allocated for research has varied over time.  Second, it does not control for the
heterogeneity in the universities receiving the research funding.  For example, if one university
has a better reputation than another, this could result in that university receiving more in research
funding because its faculty submit higher quality proposals.  Similarly, if a university has a
medical school affiliated with it, the funding allocated to that university may be greater than the
funding allocated to a university that does not have a medical school.  To address these issues,
figures 1-4 reflect the average level of funding over time to universities in the years in which
they have or do not have representation or an alma mater affiliation after controlling for non-time
varying differences across the universities.  To get this measure, I ran a fixed-effects regression
whereby I use a set of dummy variables that identify the university to allow for the average level
of funding at each university to vary based on the non-time varying differences.  I then graph the
average of the residuals of this regression.  Thus, the residuals will capture aspects of the funding
distributed to the universities that are not accounted for in the university fixed-effects.  Because
the averages are different for the public and private universities in Table 1, the figures examine
the relationship between representation and non-representation at public and private universities
differently.  In all of the figures, however, I also depict the average level of funding after
controlling for university heterogeneity across all public or private universities, respectively.
                                                                                                                                                            
16 All dollar amounts are reported in 1996 dollars.15
In Figure 1, I depict the average level of funding after controlling for university
heterogeneity for those public universities for which there was at least one year of district
representation during the sample period.  I depict separately, the average funding for those years
in which there is representation and those years for which there is no representation.  The figure
suggests there is very little difference in the average level of funding based on whether there is
representation over the sample period.  To the extent there is a difference, this is seen in the early
part of the period, prior to 1986.  Given that earmarking of funding to universities became more
prevalent in the latter part of the period, thus representing a more direct way of diverting
research funding by Congress, it is interesting there is little difference between the average
funding when there is representation and when there is no representation subsequent to 1986.
In Figure 2, I depict the average level of funding after controlling for university
heterogeneity for those private universities for which there was at least one year of district
representation during the sample period.  Again, for most of the sample period, there is very little
difference in average funding in those years for which there is representation and those years for
which there is no representation.  Subsequent to 1993, however, the gap between average
funding for those universities with representation in those years and those universities without
representation widens, providing some evidence that district representation may matter.
In Figures 3 and 4, I depict the average level of funding after controlling for university
heterogeneity for which there was at least one year of alma affiliation during the sample period
for public and private universities, respectively.  As with Table 1, both figures suggest a different
relationship between alma mater affiliation and district representation with respect to the
distribution of research funding.  For the public universities, prior to 1985, the average level of
funding is higher for those universities without an affiliation.  Between 1985 and 1989, there is
very little difference between the average funding when there is and is not an affiliation.16
Subsequent to 1989, there appears to be a substantial premium for having an alma mater
affiliation for most of the years.  With respect to the private universities, Figure 4, the average
level of funding is higher when there is an alma mater affiliation in the early and later part of the
sample, but the gap during these periods is not very big.
Table 1 and the figures suggest that alma mater affiliation matters, but district
representation may not, especially in the early part of the sample. To explore further the effect of
committee membership further I use the following model:
irt it r t r irt irt rt i irt I O A R G u s t d b l a + + + + + + = - - - - 1 1 (1)
where G represents the two year average of research funding to university i, located in region r,
at year t (and year t-1), R represents the vector of Senate and House measures indicating whether
the university has alma mater affiliation or district representation at time t-1.
17
I conduct separate analyses to measure the affect of alma mater affiliation and district
representation.  I use the general member measures and the tenure measures in separate
specifications.
18 In the specification with only the alma mater measures, I include only those
universities for which there was an alma mater affiliation during the sample period.  Because the
specifications include university fixed effects, including the universities that do not have an alma
mater affiliation would make the estimates less precise.  In this specification, included would be
universities with both an alma mater affiliation and district representation during the sample
                                                
17 Because a research grant may be awarded in one year but then distributed over several years, I average the
funding over a two-year period to reflect this.  The results, however, do not differ dramatically based on whether I
do a two-year average or a three-year average or do not average the data.  I report the results from the two-year
average because the standard errors are smaller with the average than when I do not average the research funding.
18 One potential issue concerns the correlation between the alma mater and the district political measures.  If many
of the observations contain both alma mater and district representation then the coefficients may not be interpretable
because of multicollinearity.  As it turns out, at both the university and agency level, less than ten percent of the
observations contain both an alma mater and district affiliation in the same chamber for any given year. Across the
sample, approximately 25 percent of the universities have district and alma mater representation at some point
during the sample period. These universities include some of the big state universities such as University of
Alabama, University of Wisconsin at Madison, Michigan State University, University of California at Los Angeles,
and Pennsylvania State University.17
period. Similarly, in the specification with only the district representation measures, I include
only those universities for which there was district representation during the sample period.
Given a member may have both a district and an alma mater affiliation, A indicates
whether the university has a member with the other type of affiliation at time t-1.  Thus, if we are
measuring the effect of an alma mater affiliation, R represents the vector of measures that
identify the type of alma mater affiliation and A is a dummy variable equal to one if the
university also has a member that represents the district in which the university is located.
I also include university fixed effects.  The university fixed effects control for non-time
varying heterogeneity across the universities. Because I am including university fixed effects,
however, the coefficients on the political measures represent the measurement of a change in
committee membership.  A change in membership includes a move on or off the committee and
a move from being a general member to a leadership position.
19
Given the sample period is more than 25 years, however, we might expect the universities
to have grown differently.  To account for this, I could interact the university fixed effect with a
time trend.  This specification would allow universities to grow differently. A potential problem
with this specification is if a university’s growth includes changes in its relationship with
politicians that is correlated to movement on and off the appropriations committee, then part of
the effect of having a member on the appropriations committee will be captured by the university
time trend effect. I report the results from this specification in Appendix Tables 2 and 3; for the
most part, the conclusions that may be drawn from the specifications that use a university time-
trend are similar to those reported below; the magnitude of the coefficients, however, decreases.
                                                                                                                                                            
19 If fixed effects are not included in the regression, the results suggest a very strong affiliation between membership
on the appropriations committee and alma mater or district representation.  Alma mater representation alone
accounts for approximately 12 percent of total variation in research funding to universities; district representation
alone accounts for less than 3 percent of total variation in funding.18
In equation (1), lambda represents a regional time trend that should control for changes in
economic, demographic, or political environments across time that affect all universities in a
region similarly. Such effects would include changes in the government’s budget, changes in
attitudes about research funding, macro level economic changes, and changes in the political
party in power in Congress and the Executive Office.
20
In addition to the above measures, I include measures to control for possible changes in
government policy regarding research funding that may affect universities differently as well as
to control for the impact of other universities on the actions taken by the university under study.
The first measure is the average level of research funding to universities located outside of the
region in which a university is located with the same type of ownership (public or private) and
Carnegie (1994) classification.  The second measure is the average level of research funding to
universities located in the region in which a university is located with the same type of Carnegie
(1994) classification after excluding the level of funding to the university under study.
21
There are several ways to depict political affiliation in the regression analysis.  I have
chosen four groups of measures. First, for each chamber I created two measures.  The first
measure identifies whether there is at least one member with an affiliation that is a chair of one
of the appropriations subcommittees.  The second measure identifies the number of general
members with an affiliation serving on the appropriations committee; this ranges from 0 to 3 in
the House and 0 to 2 in the Senate.  The first measure is designed to capture the effect that
                                                
20 The following states are covered within each region: Region 1: Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.  Region 2: New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.  Region 3: Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin.  Region 4: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Nebraska,
and South Dakota.  Region 5: District of Columbia, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia.  Region 6: Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee.  Region 7: Arkansas,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas.  Region 8: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and
Wyoming.  Region 9: Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington.
21 Including these measures in the specification, the coefficients, in particular those on the alma mater measures
decrease, suggesting these additional measures are picking up a time-varying measure that is correlated with
research funding and the political measures.19
Savage (1991) found that chairs of the subcommittees have power to block or to promote pork
barrel politics.  Excluded from this specification is whether there is an affiliation by the
university with the chair of the appropriations committee in either chamber.  Over the sample
period, this position changed only a few times and, thus, from an empirical perspective, there is
very little variation with which to measure the affect of the chair of the appropriations
committee.  Moreover, given the chair of the appropriations committee may have a different
agenda than the general members on the committee, it is not appropriate to include them with the
measure reflecting the number of general members on the committee.
The second group of measures is designed to reflect that tenure on the committee may
result in different preferences by the members towards pork barrel politics.  For each chamber I
created three measures.  Each measure identifies the number of members on the appropriations
committee based on the number of years the member has been on the committee.  The first
measure is for those members with zero to three years on the committee, the second measure is
for those members with four to eleven years on the committee, and the third measure is for those
members with more than eleven years on the committee.  If a member is concerned about getting
re-elected in the early years during which he serves on the committee, then we should see a
preference away from slack and towards representing one’s constituents.  If, in the later years the
member is not planning on seeking re-election, we may see more evidence of slack.
The last two groups of measures explore whether the role of congressional membership
on the distribution of research funding is different across public and private universities.  Thus, I
interact the political measures used in the first two groups with a dummy variable that indicates
whether a university is public or private, respectively.
22
                                                
22 Another specification would be to interact the general member measure with a dummy variable indicating whether
the university is classified as a research or doctoral institution.  Under this specification there is some evidence that20
IV. Results
Tables 2 and 3 report the results under the specifications described above.  Overall, the
results suggest membership on the appropriations committee influences the distribution of
research funding to universities.  The affect is strongest for those universities with an alma mater
affiliation, especially with respect to members that are chairs of a subcommittee and those
members with more seniority.  The results also suggest that private and public universities are
treated differently.  With respect to district representation, the results are weaker and are not as
consistent across the specifications.
Table 2 reports the results for the universities with district representation during the
sample period.  In column (1), I report the results for the specification that constrains the political
effect to be the same across all universities and uses as political measures whether at least one
member is a chair of a subcommittee and the number of general members serving on the
committee.  These results suggest that membership on the Senate appropriations committee
matters but not membership on the House committee.  The coefficient on the Senate general
committee member is positive and significant at less than a five percent level, suggesting that, on
average, having a member that represents the state in which an university is located will benefit
that university by $2.3 million.  If that member is also a chair of an appropriations subcommittee,
the average premium from district representation increases an additional $2.2  million.  Given the
average level of funding to universities is $42 million, having a member that is a chair of an
appropriations subcommittee represents a potential average diversion of research funding of 11
                                                                                                                                                            
doctoral universities benefit more than research universities with respect to an alma mater affiliation in the Senate
and that research universities benefit more than doctoral universities in the House. Under the various specifications,
however, these results are not robust.  In yet another specification I interacted a dummy variable representing
whether the year of funding was subsequent to 1983 with the general member measures.  The use of this interaction
is designed to capture that the actions of congress members may have changed after members started to use the
earmarking process to divert directly funds to specific universities.  Depending on the specification, the results21
percent.  The political measures are jointly significant, thus, suggesting that district
representation can influence the distribution of federal research funding.
For those universities with both district representation and an alma mater affiliation in the
same year, the coefficient on the dummy variable to indicate an alma mater affiliation is
negative, suggesting that having both types of affiliation decreases the effect of having a member
that represents the district or state in which the university is located.
In columns (2a), (2b), and (2c), I report the results when we relax the constraint that
public and private universities be treated the same.  In column (2a) I report the coefficients for
the public universities and in column (2b) I report the coefficients for the private universities; in
column (2c), I report the f-statistic for the test of whether the coefficients for the public and
private universities are different from each other.  With respect to membership on the Senate
committee, the results under this specification suggest that public and private universities are
treated differently.  With respect to public universities, the coefficient is positive for general
members but negative for members that also serve as a chair of a subcommittee; the net effect for
a member that is also a chair of a subcommittee is, however, positive ($3.5 million, on average).
For private universities, the coefficient on the measure identifying the number of general
members on the committee is imprecisely measured.  The coefficient on the measure for whether
there is a member who is a subcommittee chair, however, is quite positive, suggesting, on
average, that having a subcommittee chair increases federal research funding by $12 million.
The coefficients suggest the behavior of chairs of subcommittees is different that those of general
members.  There are several explanations for the negative coefficient for the public universities.
One explanation is the one suggested by Savage (1991); namely, that some of the individual
                                                                                                                                                            
suggest that behavior may have changed to increase diversions to universities subsequent to 1983.  Once I control
for the ownership of the university and the tenure effects of the members, however, these results are diminished.22
subcommittee chairs wielded enough power during this period to promote or to detract from pork
barrel politics.  Another explanation is one related to the issue of logrolling; namely that as a
subcommittee chair, a member may have different priorities and is willing to sacrifice funding in
one area to promote funding in another area.
In columns (3) and (4), I report the results from the specifications that identify
membership on the committee based on tenure.  With respect to membership on the Senate
appropriations committee, the surprising result is that the coefficients that are significant under
this specification are for the junior members.  The coefficients for the senior members are
imprecisely measure.  This is surprising given the coefficients in the prior specifications on the
measure that identifies if there is a member who is a subcommittee chair.  With respect to the
more junior members, the results suggest that they are more likely to favor a public university
than a private university.  On average, universities with state representation by a member with
less than four years on the committee will benefit by $3.5 million.  Members with between four
and eleven years on the committee positively affect private and public universities by similar
amounts (approximately $3 million on average).
The results reported in columns (3) and (4) are also surprising insofar as there are
coefficients with respect to representation by members on the House committee that now
significantly different from zero.  The coefficient for the members with less than four years on
the committee is positive and significant, with the private universities benefiting the most (an
average of $6.6 million).  Public universities benefit from the most senior members on the
committee; the coefficient for the private universities, however, is negative.
Across all four specifications, the results with respect to district representation are very
sensitive to the manner in which I measure committee membership.  Appendix Table 2 reports
the results when I allow for a university trend effect, thus allowing universities to grow at23
different rates.  These results suggest that only public universities are positively affected by
district representation (on both the Senate and the House of Representatives).
Table 3 reports the results for the universities with an alma mater affiliation during the
sample period.  The structure of Table 3 mirrors that of Table 2.  If we measure membership by
examining the number of general members and whether there is a member that is a subcommittee
chair with an affiliation, the results suggest a negative effect from having a subcommittee chair
in the Senate.  In the House, however, both private and public universities benefit from having a
university with an affiliation.  The net effect for public universities is $13 million from having a
member that is a subcommittee chair, representing a diversion of approximately 31 percent.
Moreover, the specifications that allow the membership on the committee to vary based on
tenure (columns (3) and (4)), suggests that public universities benefit from an affiliation with
members of all ranks, especially the more senior members.  Thus, the results for the public
universities with respect to the House are consistent across all of the specifications.
The net effect for private universities is $3 million from having a member that is a
subcommittee chair, representing a diversion of approximately 7 percent.  In the specifications
that allow the membership to vary by tenure, however, the coefficients at all ranks are negative
for the private universities.  These results are consistent with the results reported in column (2b)
if, the subcommittee chairs come from all ranks.  In most cases, this is not the case as members
with tenure on the committee tend to be appointed as a subcommittee chair.  If, however, there is
a change in the party control of the House, it would be possible for a member with low tenure on
the committee to be appointed a subcommittee chair.
With respect to the tenure measures for the Senate committee, the coefficients are
negative and statistically significant at a p-value of less than .10 for all of the measures except
for the private universities for the members with more than 11 years of experience.  Thus, these24
results suggest that universities do not benefit from having an alma mater affiliation in the
Senate.  Appendix Table 3 reports the results when a university time trend effect is included in
the specification.  These results differ from those reported in Table 3, particularly with respect to
the tenure measures.  The results in Appendix Table 3 suggest that universities positively benefit
from having a senior member on the committee with an alma mater affiliation in both chambers.
Overall, the results across all specifications with respect to the universities with an alma mater
specification suggest that universities benefit the most from senior members and subcommittee
chairs on the House committee; there is some evidence to suggest that universities also benefit
from having a member with an alma mater affiliation on the Senate committee.
In the specifications for the universities with an alma mater affiliation, I also included a
dummy variable equal to one if the university had district representation in the previous year.
The coefficient on this measure is positive and statistically significantly different from zero,
suggesting that universities benefit more from having a member that represents the district.  In
comparison to the results reported in Table 2, however, the coefficients on the alma mater
measure in that table is negative, thus contradicting the results reported in Table 3 with respect to
the district representation measure.  To explore this further, I examined in greater detail the
nature of the membership on the committees for those universities with an alma mater affiliation
and a district representative in the same year.  For the bulk of the observations, these two types
of affiliations arise in the Senate, thus, suggesting the coefficients on the alma mater measure
and the district measure in Tables 2 and 3, respectively, reflect primarily the effect of a
university having an affiliation with a member from the Senate.  As such, the coefficients do not
contradict each other in these two tables.  In Table 2, the coefficients for the Senate measures are
positive and the coefficient on the alma mater measure is negative.  This suggests that having a
senator that has both an alma mater affiliation and represents the state in which a university is25
located decreases the effect of any pork that may be distributed to the university compared to
universities with only district representative.  In Table 3, the coefficients for the Senate measures
are negative and the district measure is positive.  This suggests that having a senator that has
both an alma mater affiliation and represents the state in which a university is located increases
the effect of any pork that may be distributed to the university compared to universities with only
an alma mater affiliation.
All of the tables illustrate that membership alone is not a sufficient predictor of whether a
university may benefit from having an affiliation with a member on the appropriations
committee.  The factors that appear to be important are the member’s chamber, the tenure on the
committee, whether a member is a chair of an appropriations subcommittee, and whether the
university is public or private.  With respect to being a subcommittee chair, over the sample
period, universities benefited most from the members of the Senate committee if the senator
represented the state in which the university is located; universities benefited most from the
members of the House committee if the representative had an alma mater affiliation with the
universities.  With respect to tenure on the committee, the results suggest that seniority counts
most in the House for both district representation and alma mater affiliation.  Public universities
benefit from district representation in the Senate and from senior members on the House
committee.  Public universities benefit from alma mater affiliations on the House committee.
Private universities benefit from district representation in the House by junior members on the
committee.  Private universities benefit from an alma mater affiliation in the House by members
that are chairs of an appropriations subcommittee.
V.  Conclusion
This paper supports the theoretical literature that Congress and agencies behave
strategically.  This paper suggests that research funding to universities is diverted to and from26
universities due to the politics.  Thus, this paper illustrates that, as will any other discretionary
program which requires appropriations from Congress, because of lobbying from agencies,
research universities, or other entities, research funding may be diverted for political purposes.
This paper finds that both alma mater affiliation and district representation of universities
matter.  With respect to district representation, the initial results fail to show any effect from
having a member on the appropriations committee that represents the district or state in which a
university is located.  With some teasing of the data, however, the results suggest that indeed
there is an effect from representation, especially in the Senate.  With respect to alma mater
affiliation, the results suggest very clearly there is an affect on the distribution of research
funding to universities for which there is an alma mater affiliation.  This is particularly true with
respect to affiliations with public universities by members in the House.
The results also suggest evidence of political slack by members.  To the extent that
funding is diverted to universities in member’s districts as well as to universities with which a
member has an alma mater affiliation, given, in most instances, a member’s alma mater is not
located in that member’s district, diversion of funds that is associated with a member serving on
the appropriations committee supports the notion that political slack exists.
In a broader context, this paper illustrates potential problems that develop when members
of congress have a long tenure on a committee.  The diversions of funding associated with
district representation and/or alma mater affiliation tend to be bigger for the senior members
serving on the committee.  Thus, this paper suggests that seniority on a committee may promote
political slack. Whether this promotes or detracts from the efficient use of research funding, is
left for future research.  In addition, the question of whether seniority on a committee matters, it
is left for future research to determine if switching committees reduces the effects of such slack.27
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Table 1: Average Level of Annual Federal Research Obligations to Universities
# of Obs Mean S.D. S.D./Mean Median Maximum
All Universities 5327 41.6 66.4 1.6 16.9 795.2
   Public Schools 3420 37.5 50.4 1.3 19.2 351.1
   Private Schools 1907 48.9 87.7 1.8 13.9 795.2
Universities with Alma Mater Affiliation
Alma Mater Affiliation 966 75.8 69.1 0.9 56.0 351.1
   Public Schools 643 71.5 67.6 0.9 49.7 351.1
   Private Schools 323 84.3 71.4 0.8 62.3 303.9
No Alma Mater Affiliation 783 54.1 59.5 1.1 31.2 332.6
   Public Schools 554 45.7 44.6 1.0 31.2 245.5
   Private Schools 229 74.4 82.0 1.1 32.5 332.6
Universities with District Representation
District Representation 2504 42.5 71.8 1.7 18.4 795.2
   Public Schools 1601 37.3 51.1 1.4 20.5 351.1
   Private Schools 903 51.6 97.7 1.9 14.0 795.2
No District Representation 1817 47.2 69.6 1.5 17.9 671.9
   Public Schools 1104 41.2 54.2 1.3 19.8 289.0
   Private Schools 713 56.5 87.5 1.5 15.7 671.9
Note: All dollars are reported in millions ($1996).  Universities studied are those with a Carnegie (1994)
classification of Research or Doctoral Universities32
Table 2: Role of Politics on Federal Research Funding: District Representation
Universities with District Representation Private=Public Private=Public # of Schools
Dependent Variable: Public Private F-test Public Private F-test with representation
Annual Federal Funding (2 yr average) (1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) Public Private
Senate Appropriations
  At Least 1 SubCommittee Chair 2.17 -1.34 12.61 9.68 76 28
(1.11) (0.70) (4.34) (0.00)
  General Member 2.31 4.78 -2.26 15.56 105 63
(0.65) (0.66) (1.58) (0.00)
  Tenure < 4 years 1.25 3.48 -3.59 6.53 104 63
(0.98) (0.71) (2.65) (0.01)
  Tenure 4-11 years 3.28 3.27 3.01 0.02 91 55
(0.87) (0.69) (1.77) (0.88)
   Tenure 11+ years -0.51 0.64 -2.70 2.78 58 36
(0.89) (0.95) (1.81) (0.10)
House Appropriations
  At Least 1 SubCommittee Chair 0.69 0.75 0.38 0.01 4 4
(2.18) (1.69) (3.77) (0.93)
  General Member 0.97 1.69 1.07 0.11 21 24
(0.94) (1.33) (1.34) (0.74)
  Tenure < 4 years 2.88 -0.63 6.60 8.33 16 19
(1.32) (1.52) (2.09) (0.00)
  Tenure 4-11 years -1.67 -0.25 -3.08 1.17 14 16
(1.22) (1.88) (1.78) (0.28)
   Tenure 11+ years 1.60 8.24 -4.46 15.56 10 15
(1.70) (2.47) (2.18) (0.00)
F-test on All Political Measures 6.40 7.42 5.42 5.38
       (p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Alma Mater Affiliation -1.99 -2.45 -1.89 -2.18
(0.87) (0.91) (0.87) (0.90)
Average Funding Outside of Region 0.99 0.97 0.99 1.01
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Average Funding Within Region -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
University Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Trend Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Observations 4259 4259 4259 4259
# of Schools 181 181 181 181
R-Squared 0.934 0.9347 0.934 0.9345
 Note: Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis, Except Where Noted; all regressions reported over 2 columns; General Member = Number of members on the Appropriations Committee, excluding
the majority leader and ranking minority member on the committee; Tenure: number of years of service on the Appropriations Committee for all members; Average Funding Outside of Region =
Average federal obligations for universities with same type of ownership   (public or private) and Carnegie (1994) Classification (Research I, II, Doctoral I, II) located outside of the region; Average
Funding Within Region = Average federal obligations for universities with same type of  Carnegie (1994) Classification located in the same region as the university under study; Regional Trend
Effect = Dummy Variable indicating which region (out of 9) the university under studied is located interacted with a dummy variable for public and private universities and a year indicator;
University Fixed Effects with a Time Trend = set of university dummy variables + set of university dummy variables interacted with a year indicator33
Table 3: Role of Politics on Federal Research Funding: Alma Mater Affiliation
Private=Public Private=Public
Dependent Variable: Public Private F-test Public Private F-test # of Schools
Annual Federal Funding (2 yr average) (1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) Public Private
Senate Appropriations
  At Least 1 SubCommittee Chair -3.36 -4.17 -0.33 1.24 20 8
(1.51) (1.80) (2.87) (0.27)
  General Member -1.71 -2.00 -2.66 0.07 27 11
(1.22) (1.65) (1.83) (0.79)
  Tenure < 4 years -2.39 -3.11 -3.75 0.07 27 11
(1.35) (1.73) (1.86) (0.80)
  Tenure 4-11 years -5.28 -6.16 -5.08 0.18 22 9
(1.30) (1.78) (1.81) (0.67)
   Tenure 11+ years -2.23 -5.33 2.33 4.20 11 5
(1.79) (2.44) (2.91) (0.04)
House Appropriations
  At Least 1 SubCommittee Chair 8.33 7.90 8.41 0.01 14 6
(2.15) (2.65) (3.83) (0.91)
  General Member 1.97 4.94 -4.94 27.78 40 18
(0.88) (0.96) (1.60) (0.00)
  Tenure < 4 years 2.59 4.44 -4.29 13.07 40 18
(1.06) (1.09) (2.17) (0.00)
  Tenure 4-11 years 2.66 5.17 -4.80 25.38 30 15
(0.94) (1.00) (1.73) (0.00)
   Tenure 11+ years 11.09 18.31 -8.96 69.45 16 9
(1.87) (2.33) (2.65) (0.00)
F-test on All Political Measures 11.37 9.68 9.06 9.22
       (p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
District/ Representation 2.82 3.22 2.77 3.12
(0.82) (0.81) (0.82) (0.80)
Average Funding Outside of Region 0.81 0.79 0.80 0.87
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Average Funding Within Region 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
University Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Trend Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Observations 1727 1727 1727 1727
# of Schools 73 73 73 73
R-Squared 0.9626 0.9634 0.963 0.9647
 Note: Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis, Except Where Noted; see notes to Table 234
Appendix Table 1: List of Universities Studied
Universities With District and Alma Mater Affiliations State Carnegie Class
University of Alabama AL D1
University of Arkansas AR R2
University of Arizona AZ R1
Stanford University CA R1
University of California-Los Angeles CA R1
Yale University CT R1
University of Florida FL R1
University of Georgia GA R1
University of Hawaii at Manoa HI R1
Iowa State University IA R1
Northwestern University IL R1
University of Chicago IL R1
Purdue University IN R1
University of Kentucky KY R1
University of Louisville KY R2
Tulane University LA R1
Mississippi State University MS R2
University of Mississippi MS R2
North Dakota State University ND D2
University of Nebraska at Lincoln NE R1
Dartmouth College NH D2
Princeton University NJ R1
Rutgers University NJ R1
University of New Mexico NM R1
University of Nevada-Reno NV D2
Columbia University NY R1
Cornell University NY R1
Syracuse University NY R2
Case Western Reserve University OH R1
Oklahoma State University OK R2
Pennsylvania State U PA R1
University of Pennsylvania PA R1
Vanderbilt University TN R1
University of Utah UT R1
University of Washington - Seattle WA R1
Washington State University WA R2
University of Wisconsin-Madison WI R1
Arizona State University AZ R1
San Diego State University CA D2
California Institute of Technology CA R1
University of California-Berkeley CA R1
University of Connecticut CT R1
Indiana State University IN D2
Indiana University IN R1
University of Notre Dame IN R2
Boston College MA D1
Harvard University MA R1
University of Maryland at College Park MD R1
University of Minnesota MN R1
University of Missouri, Columbia MO R1
University of New Hampshire NH D2
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute NY R2
SUNY at Albany NY R2
University of Oklahoma OK R2
University of Oregon OR R2
University of Pittsburgh PA R1
Middle Tennessee State University TN D2
Baylor University TX D2
Texas A&M University TX R1
University of Texas at Austin TX R1
University of Houston TX R2
Utah State University UT R1
Universities with District Representation Only
University of Alaska, Fairbanks AK D2
University of Alabama in Huntsville AL D2
University of Alabama at Birmingham AL R1
Auburn University AL R2
Northern Arizona University AZ D1
Loma Linda University CA D2
Pepperdine University CA D2
University of San Diego CA D2
University of San Francisco CA D235
University of the Pacific CA D2
University of California-Davis CA R1
University of California-Irvine CA R1
University of California-San Diego CA R1
University of California-San Francisco CA R1
University of California-Santa Barbara CA R1
University of Southern California CA R1
University of California-Riverside CA R2
University of California-Santa Cruz CA R2
Colorado School of Mines CO D2
Florida Institute of Technology FL D1
Nova Southeastern University FL D1
Florida Atlantic University FL D2
Florida International University FL D2
University of Central Florida FL D2
Florida State University FL R1
University of Miami FL R1
University of South Florida FL R2
Clark Atlanta University GA D1
Georgia State University GA D1
Emory University GA R1
Georgia Institute of Technology GA R1
University of Iowa IA R1
Idaho State University ID D2
University of Idaho ID R2
Loyola University of Chicago IL D1
University of Illinois at Chicago IL R1
Ball State University IN D1
Louisiana Tech University LA D2
University of Southwestern Louisiana LA D2
Louisiana State University LA R1
Clark University MA D2
University of Massachusetts Lowell MA D2
Worcester Polytechnic Institute MA D2
Boston University MA R1
Massachusetts Institute of Technology MA R1
Tufts University MA R1
University of Massachusetts at Amherst MA R1
Brandeis University MA R2
Northeastern University MA R2
University of Maryland Baltimore County MD D2
Johns Hopkins University MD R1
University of Michigan MI R1
University of Missouri, Kansas City MO D1
University of Missouri, Rolla MO D1
University of Missouri, St Louis MO D2
Washington University MO R1
St Louis University MO R2
University of Southern Mississippi MS D1
Montana State University - Bozeman MT D2
University of Montana MT D2
University of North Dakota ND D2
New Jersey Institute Technology NJ D2
Seton Hall University NJ D2
Stevens Institute of Technology NJ D2
New Mexico State University NM R1
Adelphi University NY D1
CUNY Graduate School and University Center NY D1
Fordham University NY D1
Hofstra University NY D1
New School for Social Research NY D1
Polytechnic University NY D1
SUNY at Binghamton NY D1
St John’s University (Jamaica, NY) NY D1
Clarkson University NY D2
Pace University NY D2
New York University NY R1
Rockefeller University NY R1
SUNY at Buffalo NY R1
SUNY at Stony Brook NY R1
University of Rochester NY R1
Yeshiva University NY R1
University of Toledo OH D1
Cleveland State University OH D2
Ohio University OH R236
University of Tulsa OK D2
Portland State University OR D2
Oregon State University OR R1
Drexel University PA D1
Indiana University of PA PA D1
Allegheny University of the Health Sciences PA D2
Duquesne University PA D2
Carnegie Mellon University PA R1
Temple University PA R1
Lehigh University PA R2
Brown University RI R1
University of Rhode Island RI R2
Clemson University SC R2
University of South Carolina SC R2
University of South Dakota SD D1
University of Memphis TN D1
Tennessee State University TN D2
University of Tennessee at Knoxville TN R1
Southern Methodist University TX D1
Texas Woman’s University TX D1
University of North TX TX D1
University of Texas at Arlington TX D1
University of Texas at Dallas TX D1
Texas Christian University TX D2
Texas Southern University TX D2
Rice University TX R2
Texas Tech University TX R2
Brigham Young University UT R2
George Mason University VA D2
University of Virginia VA R1
University of Vermont VT R2
Marquette University WI D1
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee WI R2
West Virginia University WV R1
University of Wyoming WY R2
Universities with Alma Mater Affiliation Only
University of Denver CO D1
University of Colorado CO R1
Georgetown University DC R1
Howard University DC R1
Wichita State University KS D2
Kansas State University KS R2
Michigan State University MI R1
Wake Forest University NC D2
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill NC R1
College of William and Mary VA D1
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University VA R1
Universities with No Affiliation
Claremont Graduate School CA D1
United States International University CA D1
Biola University CA D2
University of La Verne CA D2
University of Northern Colorado CO D1
Colorado State University CO R1
American University DC D1
Catholic University of America DC D1
George Washington University DC R2
University of Delaware DE R2
Illinois Institute of Technology IL D1
Illinois State University IL D1
Northern Illinois University IL D1
De Paul University IL D2
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign IL R1
Southern Illinois University-Carbondale IL R2
University of Kansas KS R1
University of Maine ME D2
Andrews University MI D1
Western Michigan University MI D1
Michigan Technological University MI D2
University of Detroit Mercy MI D2
Wayne State University MI R1
University of North Carolina at Greensboro NC D1
Duke University NC R1
North Carolina State University at Raleigh NC R1
Bowling Green State University OH D137
Miami University OH D1
University of Akron OH D1
Wright State University OH D2
Ohio State University OH R1
University of Cincinnati OH R1
Kent State University OH R2
Old Dominion University VA D1
Virginia Commonwealth University VA R138
Appendix Table 2: Regressions for District Representation, with University Time Trend
Private=Public Private=Public
Dependent Variable: Public Private F-test Public Private F-test
Annual Federal Funding (2 yr average) (1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c)
Senate Appropriations
  At Least 1 SubCommittee Chair 0.47 0.35 0.64 0.01
(0.61) (0.34) (2.36) (0.90)
  General Member 0.58 1.38 -0.95 6.84
(0.45) (0.31) (1.16) (0.01)
  Tenure < 4 years 0.70 1.74 -1.42 5.66
(0.49) (0.36) (1.27) (0.02)
  Tenure 4-11 years 0.89 1.34 -0.16 1.27
(0.53) (0.34) (1.30) (0.26)
   Tenure 11+ years 0.48 1.20 -0.73 2.55
(0.53) (0.54) (1.11) (0.12)
House Appropriations
  At Least 1 SubCommittee Chair -1.19 1.54 -4.63 3.73
(1.30) (1.07) (2.11) (0.05)
  General Member -0.74 -2.49 0.75 10.51
(0.45) (0.81) (0.59) (0.00)
  Tenure < 4 years -0.34 -2.04 1.23 8.19
(0.51) (0.85) (0.76) (0.00)
  Tenure 4-11 years -1.75 -4.95 0.05 10.09
(0.69) (1.31) (0.87) (0.00)
   Tenure 11+ years 1.45 2.49 0.03 2.52
(0.78) (1.03) (1.17) (0.11)
F-test on All Political Measures 1.89 5.19 2.71 5.21
       (p-value) (0.11) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
District/Alma Mater Representation* -2.29 -2.44 -2.30 0.60
(0.63) (0.63) (0.63) (0.08)
Average Funding Outside of Region 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Average Funding Within Region 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.29
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
# of Observations 4259 4259 4259 4259
# of Schools 181 181 181 181
R-Squared 0.9843 0.9843 0.9843 0.984439
Appendix Table 3: Regressions for Alma Mater Affiliation, with University Time Trend
Private=Public Private=Public
Dependent Variable: Public Private F-test Public Private F-test
Annual Federal Funding (2 yr average) (1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c)
Senate Appropriations
  At Least 1 SubCommittee Chair 1.34 0.22 4.62 4.99
(0.83) (0.91) (1.74) (0.03)
  General Member -1.01 0.12 -3.12 5.29
(0.67) (0.85) (1.12) (0.02)
  Tenure < 4 years -0.38 1.11 -3.56 10.58
(0.70) (0.89) (1.13) (0.00)
  Tenure 4-11 years -2.28 -1.62 -3.55 1.82
(0.73) (0.99) (1.06) (0.18)
   Tenure 11+ years 2.01 1.88 2.13 0.02
(0.95) (1.30) (1.53) (0.90)
House Appropriations
  At Least 1 SubCommittee Chair 3.82 3.33 3.48 0.00
(1.77) (2.08) (3.28) (0.97)
  General Member -1.01 0.07 -3.58 9.12
(0.54) (0.61) (1.05) (0.00)
  Tenure < 4 years -0.33 0.84 -3.82 8.57
(0.64) (0.70) (1.43) (0.00)
  Tenure 4-11 years -1.77 -1.15 -3.69 2.65
(0.64) (0.72) (1.40) (0.10)
   Tenure 11+ years 1.69 2.14 -1.59 1.75
(1.13) (1.28) (2.50) (0.19)
F-test on All Political Measures 2.91 3.04 6.06 4.11
       (p-value) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
District/Alma Mater Representation* 1.92 1.84 1.94 1.87
(0.55) (0.56) (0.54) (0.55)
Average Funding Outside of Region 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.86
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Average Funding Within Region 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.29
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
# of Observations 1727 1727 1727 1727
# of Schools 73 73 73 73
R-Squared 0.988 0.9881 0.9881 0.9882